Indonesian CSO network: *Instrumentum* or *locus* of power?

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Abstract

The proliferation of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the emergence of civil society activism across various issues has been evident in South-east Asia (SEA) over the past few decades. In Indonesia, CSOs have been playing a pivotal role in society, both as development institutions and as advocacy groups. On issues ranging from globalisation-led development and human rights to democratisation, labour conditions and corporate malpractices, Indonesian CSOs and activists represent an increasingly important constituency in a non-state as well as non-business environment in the country. With CSOs being seen as a power bearing actor in society, civil society can bring about social and political change. Indonesian CSO networks are increasingly associated with values related to grassroots participatory democracy and thus have become a powerful cultural ideal. Particularly among civil society groups, networks have become a guiding logic that provides both a model of and a model for emerging forms of directly democratic politics. However, perhaps surprisingly, very few scholars have begun to consider CSOs and their networks in their scholarly work on Indonesia.

Based on countrywide fieldwork involving survey, workshops and interviews, this research is an attempt to empirically portray Indonesian CSOs as a power-bearing actor in Indonesian society. Informed by the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and the civil society and social movements literature (Deakin, 2001; Crossley, 2002; Della-Porta and Diani, 2006; among many others), this research investigates the proliferation of the CSO movement and network in the country. Engagement in power contestation in Indonesian society is a two-way process for CSOs, it both affects and is affected by CSO networks, which evolve from time to time. While societal settings changes (resulting from power contestation) Indonesian CSOs themselves evolve, including their internal dynamics. The landscape of Indonesian CSOs is thus a result of the engagement in power contestation, and at the same time, of the dynamics of the organisations themselves. Here, as time-space is not only an arena where the change takes place but a constitutive element of change, the Indonesian CSO network too has ‘evolved’ from a mere instrument for organising movements and actions into a locus of power itself.
1. Introduction

Over the past few decades the role of civil society in Southeast Asia (SEA) has become increasingly pivotal. Not only do civil society groups and organisations (CSOs) proliferate but also their activism has mushroomed, changing the landscape of civic engagement and governance in the region. Following the 1997 crisis that badly hit Asia, civil society became an inseparable part in any explanation elucidating what still held the region together (Pye, 1999) and how the region has recovered (Abbott, 2001; Bird, 1999; Dang, 2009; Hernandez and Dewitt, 2003). CSOs and social movements have been particularly active in promoting democratisation and human-rights as the space for political and civil liberties increase (Dang, 2009). SEA CSOs also want to institutionalise this engagement. The recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Bangkok in February 2009 witnessed how SEA CSOs endeavour to campaign for a ‘people-centred ASEAN’ by pressuring ASEAN leaders to seriously take into account the issues of human rights, free trade agreements, and the impact of the global economic slowdown. For the first time in history, the secretary-general of ASEAN and Thai Foreign Minister, representing the host country, took part in an hour-long session with SEA CSOs which marked the beginning of a more open process to everyone in the region (Macan-Markar, 2009). This reflects an a positive trend since, for the past four decades, ASEAN has seldom listened to , let alone heeded , the voices of civil society.

The development of civil society activism at the SEA level certainly cannot be separated from, and in fact reflects and at the same time is reflected by, the dynamics of civil society in the individual countries in the region. In Indonesia, one of ASEAN founding members and the biggest in terms of population, civil society and social movement have also been playing an instrumental role in society, both as development institutions and as advocacy groups – two broad categorisations that have helped explain the dynamics of the Indonesian civil society (Eldridge, 1995; Fakih, 1996; Ganie-Rochman, 2000; Hadiwinata, 2003; Hope and Timmel, 1988). Since the reform in 1998, there has been an obvious boom in civil society activities in Indonesia focussing on widening civic engagement in its broadest sense. Although most studies of civil society cannot be separated from the discourse of democracy and democratisation (e.g. Abbott, 2001; Coleman, 1999; Glasius et al., 2005; Wainwright, 2005), to better understand Indonesian civil society, the perspective may need to be opened wider for general civil society endeavours promoting civil supremacy in addition to fostering wider democracy.

The roles of CSOs in Indonesia span from providing humanitarian aid, to development of urban and rural communities, to carrying out training and capacity building and to acting as watchdog organisations (Billah, 1995; Fakih, 1996; Hadiwinata, 2003). They also advocate consumers’ rights, support labour and trade union activities and protect the environment from businesses’ wrongdoings through research, lobbying and advocacy endeavours. In addition these organisations conduct watchdog activities, carry out campaigns abroad and organise various testimonial sessions before international bodies like Amnesty International or the Human Rights Commission at the UN and
pressurise the government for policy changes (Ganie-Rochman, 2002; Hadiz, 1998; Harney and Olivia, 2003; Lounela, 1999). Different groups facilitate small-medium businesses with training and access to marketplaces and educate farmers about organic and sustainable farming processes, empower women in rural areas to access micro-credit schemes as well as influence consumer choice about healthier, more fairly traded products and produce. Various civil society groups emphasise the importance and urgency of the fulfilment of workers’ rights, protection of the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and public awareness of economic, social and cultural (ecosoc) rights through public opinion building. They, too, conduct various political awareness workshops and capacity building trainings for young people across the archipelago to prepare them to become the ‘agents of change’ in the future1.

Clearly various groups and organisations within Indonesian civil society have played an important role in the country’s development. Not only has the Indonesian socio-political landscape changed because of this, but this also indicates CSOs as a power bearing actor in Indonesian society that can bring about social and political change. Social movements are a mechanism of civil society to engage in wider power contestation (Davis et al., 2005; Della-Porta and Diani, 2006; McAdam, 2003), one way in which to understand the dynamics of their embedded power is by looking at their networks (as argued by, for example, Diani, 2003). Indonesian CSO networks are increasingly associated with values related to grassroots participatory democracy and thus have become a powerful cultural ideal (as also suggested by Castells, 1996). Particularly among civil society groups, networks have become a guiding logic that provides both a model of and a model for emerging forms of directly democratic politics. Following this logic, networks of social movement can actually be seen as loci of power: not only has civil society activism gained pivotal weight by means of more partnerships in the movement, networking itself has become a facilitating way to accumulate power. However, this is more often assumed, than fully realised.

This paper explores the processes by which different groups within civil society in Indonesia network among themselves and by doing so, intentionally more than inadvertently, create a locus of power in society. Using a multi-methods approach involving a country-scale survey, workshops and interviews, this study attempts to empirically portray Indonesian CSOs as a power-bearing actor shaping the Indonesian socio-political landscape, particularly during and after the 1998 reform. Informed by the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and the civil society and social movements literature (Deakin, 2001; Crossley, 2002; Della-Porta and Diani, 2006; among many others), this research investigates the proliferation of civil society movements and CSO networks in the country. This paper argues that engagement in power contestation in Indonesian society is a two-way process for CSOs. It both affects and is affected by CSO networks, which evolve over time. While societal settings change

1 This observation is part of the author’s earlier work (Nugroho, 2007)
Indonesian CSOs themselves evolve, including their internal dynamics. The landscape of Indonesian CSOs is thus a result of the engagement in power contestation, and at the same time, of the dynamics of the organisations themselves. Here, time-space is not only an arena where the change takes place but also a constitutive element of change; the Indonesian CSO network has ‘evolved’ from a mere instrument for organising movements and actions into a locus of power itself.

After setting out the background in this introduction, this paper continues by reviewing the literature on civil society and its relations to networks of social movement and power. It also examines in more detail some trajectories of Indonesian CSOs and how the Theory of Structuration informs the study. The third section outlines the methodology employed before section four elaborates the findings and section five discusses them in more depth. Section six concludes the study.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Civil society and networks of social movement in contemporary Indonesia

Civil society is often referred to as the foundation of the societal sphere in that it provides a voice for the disenfranchised and creates a loci of influence outside the state and economy (Anheier et al., 2002; Anheier et al., 2001b; Deakin, 2001; Keane, 1998). Civil society organisation (CSO) refers to the entity of the sphere of social life which organises itself autonomously, as opposed to the sphere that is established and/or directly controlled by the state (Deakin, 2001:4-8). Thus, CSO here is understood as an autonomous, democratic civil society entity, as expressed in organisations independent of the state or corporate structure. This formulation traces back to Gramsci (1971) who argues that civil society is not only the sphere where existing social order is grounded but also where new social order can be founded. This notion is central to help understand the strength of the status quo so that a strategy for its transformation can be devised. What is substantial here, perhaps, is the ‘emancipatory potential’ of civil society, which is an ‘elastic’ concept that has different connotations in different courses (Gramsci, 1971:263). Gramsci’s perspective shows there is a dialectic relationship inherent in civil society. In one direction, the ideological agencies that are sustained by the state’s coercive apparatus shape morals and culture. In the other direction, civil society has autonomy, is more fundamental than the state, and hence is the basis upon which a state can be founded. Civil society is thus both shaping and being shaped—an agent of stabilisation, reproduction, and clearly transformation. Social movements are also not an easy concept to understand (Diani, 1990; Diani, 2002).

A more operational and descriptive definition is offered by Centre of Civil Society at LSE: civil society constitutes a sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market (CCS, 2006).
2003). They are not simply specific insurgences but more similar to connected actions across time and space. Often social movements cannot just be identified with a particular CSO but consist of various groups and organisations, formal to informal, which are linked in patterns of interactions. These interactions may be loose but can also be tight; they may be fairly centralised but can also be highly decentralised. The actions could be cooperative but can also be hostile. Social movements are, in short, “complex and highly heterogeneous network structure” (Diani, 2003:1).

The history of civil society and social movements in Indonesia traces back to the early days of the country long before the 1945 independence, possibly since the establishment of the first indigenous youngster (pemuda bumiputera) organisation Boedi Oetomo in 1908 (Clear, 2005). Since then civil society has been an inseparable part of the dynamics of the country. Without discounting the importance of the history, this paper looks at the more recent dynamics of Indonesian civil society and CSOs3. After the heightened period of crises and political upheaval in 1996-2001 it may be useful here to look at the historical trajectories to learn what clues the past may offer into the country’s future, from the perspective of civil society. In its study in 2003-2005, Demos, a research CSO in Indonesia, tries to map both social (and political) legacies of Indonesia as a nation in the transition to democracy and concludes the four following points (Demos, 2005b). Firstly, there is a democratic deficit of rights and institutions: Indonesia’s democracy is neither well under way nor irreversible, there are basic freedoms but there is a severe deficit of properly functioning instruments of democracy. Second, there are elections but not representation: free and fair elections have not been realized, representation for elections is limited to unrepresentative and irresponsive political parties (and politicians). It is difficult to improve Indonesia’s fledgling democracy in a democratic way unless there is proper representation of people’s ideas and interests. Third, there is an oligarchic democracy: as new democracies around the world suffer from persistent dominance of the elite, the problem in Indonesia is that the elite monopolises democracy, bending and abusing the rules of the game for their own interest. However, it is not appropriate to remedy the situation by implementing either liberal or state-centrist politics as both are part of the monopoly-breeding nexus between state and business, with deep roots since colonialism. Last, floating and marginalised agents of change. As the agents of change who brought democracy to Indonesia, civil society activists and pressure groups

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3 It might be worth noting that in Indonesia the terms CSO and NGO have a rather complicated interpretation and understanding compared to what we may have seen in the literature. Traced back to 1970s, the term Organisasi non-pemerintah (ORNOP) was used as a direct translation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) but then replaced by Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM) which literally means ‘self-reliant organisation’ (SRO), most of which was because of fear among activists that the term ORNOP might provoke government repression. Some also proposed another term, LPSM (Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat or self-help community support institution) which was deemed to have more resemblance with what was known as NGO, while others started using Organisasi nir-laba (non-profit organisation). It seems that Indonesian NGO activists never reach consensus (Hadiwinata, 2003: 6-7). Only after the political reform in 1998 as described in a previous subsection, activists started using and popularising the term Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (civil society organisation/CSO) to distinctively distinguish civil- and community-initiated organisations from the ones run or initiated by military, government and business. This paper uses the term CSOs to include all kind of organisations within the scope of the definitions cited earlier.
remain ‘floating’ in the margins of the fledgling democratic system, instead of directly involved in it, and are thus unable to make a real impact.

Those points may at first seem gloomy, but they actually give hints to see some plausible future from the perspective of democratisation, which, if pursued, can transcend current problems like ethno-religious conflicts and nurture healthy economic development. It is important that the agenda to de-monopolise and resurrect democracy should be in place if Indonesia wants to see democracy work. This can be done by, among others, widening the social base for local civic capacities, transforming concrete issues and interests among emerging movements into governance agendas, facilitating political formations and fostering combined forms of direct democracy in civil society and representative democracy via political institutions (Beard, 2005; Bresnan, 2005; Clear, 2005; Demos, 2005a; 2005b; Hikam, 1999; Kalibonso, 1999; Lounela, 1999; Uhlin, 2000). In this light, politically, it is important to realise that Indonesia’s future is no longer unified by a nation state project, but by promoting democracy that is not balkanised as a potential basis for unity. A better future for democracy in Indonesia could be achieved if priority is given to solving the problem of political representation (Hefner, 2005; Kalibonso, 1999; Tumenggung and Nugroho, 2005). This can be addressed by, for example, promoting democratic, accountable and responsive political parties and interest organisations and fostering more democratic forms of direct participation (Clear, 2005; Demos, 2005a; 2005b; Hefner, 2005).

Learning from the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian regimes in East Asia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, formal elections and legislatures are alone not enough to make democracy work. It is stressed that citizen groupings and civil society are vital for strengthening democratic and pluralist habits of citizens. This is what is termed ‘social capital’ by Putnam (1993) after he concluded that the performance of government and other social institution is powerfully influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs. In a context like Indonesia, the formation of social capital will fail without enactment of civil society for without them there will be no traditions of public association and cooperation—that go beyond ethnicities, localities and religions—which can provide fuel for nation making and democracy. Often, the enactment of civil society happens through networks (Castells, 1996), both of organisations and of movements, and both vertically and horizontally (Lim, 2003; Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2008). For example, vertical network of movement can be seen from the rapid integration of local civil society groups to global civil society (and the other way around) that has created an impetus for civil society to play more important role in social transformation (Anheier et al., 2001b; Bartelson, 2006; Kaldor, 2003), which is clearly observed in Indonesian civil society. Horizontal network of organisations can also be seen from the rapid expansion of national networks of Indonesian CSOs, which enabled them to put pressure towards the
power holders, and thus promoted, changes in society (as also hinted by Della-Porta and Diani, 2006; Diani, 2003).

Network perspective has been used as a tool to portray projects undertaken by civil society (e.g. Castells, 1996), within which the promotion of democracy seems to be the major agenda item (among very few case, if not none, on Indonesia see Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2008). Networking through the use of new media communication like the Internet for example, has strengthened the identity of Indonesian CSOs working for social reform. This has been done particularly through actions like coalition building, building opposition, campaigning, mobilisation and observation/watchdog activities (Nugroho, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; forthcoming). What makes it important is that as networks link a multiplicity of actors, it becomes a necessary condition for facilitating change (Anheier, 2003; Uhlin, 2000). After all, social movement is all about networks: of ideas, of awareness, of organisations, and of activisms (Diani, 2003; McAdam, 2003), aiming at widening direct involvement of civil society groups and organisations, be it local, regional, or global (Anheier et al., 2001a; Anheier et al., 2004).

In the Indonesian civil society context, however, very few works have been done using network approach to understand the dynamics of civil society⁴. This paper aspires to take on this challenge, looking at how the networking of Indonesian civil society is built and what it implies.

2.2. Networking the movement, contesting power: Structuration perspective

On the one hand, network theory often emphasises the importance of structure, which explains the networks performance. Through network and networking, ‘social capital’ of civil society is built as CSOs can bridge connections between otherwise segregated segments of social movement. Borrowing Putnam’s notion (Putnam, 1993:167), social capital here refers to features such as trust and norms, that improves the efficiency of civil society groups and organisations by facilitating coordinated action. The focus is related concerns like coordination, coalition building, and movement leadership in network. In addition, social capital is also metaphor about advantage (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993) where society can be seen as a locus in which CSOs exchange all variety of ideas in pursuit of their interests. Hence, as a clue in network analysis, in the network of social movement, CSOs who perform ‘better’ are usually better connected: certain organisations are connected to certain others, support certain others, exchange with certain others (Burt, 2000; Della-Porta and Diani, 2006; Diani, 2003). As a structure, position in network reflects a modality or asset in its own right and performance of a network can be seen as the resources that result from social structure (Diani, 2003).

⁴ Among the few is the author’s earlier work (Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2008).
On the other hand, social movement theories repeatedly underline the significance of actor’s voluntary actions that signifies the works of the organised groups within social movement including civil society organisations. For example, civil society dynamics can be understood from the perspective of collective behaviour collective action which explained factors influencing collective social action (Blumer, 1951). Of course that certain conditions are assumed and this is needed for the development of a social movement as side-effects of rapid social change (Smelser, 1962), but it depends on the ability of members of the movement to acquire resources and mobilise people in order to advance their goals, as theorised in the resource mobilisation theory. Considering social movements as rational social institutions and social actors taking political action, there are two major versions in the theory: the classic entrepreneurial (economic) (Zald and McCarthy 1987) and the political (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). After this, came frame analysis theory, closely related to social constructionist theory followed by employing framing and social constructionism paradigms on the large social interactionism paradigm. It focuses on the symbolic presentation of a movement to its participant and to general public (Goffman, 1974). Most recently, new social movement theory becomes popular. It looks at various collective actions, their identity and on their relations to culture, ideology and politics (Kendall, 2005).

While the network perspective is often criticised to have become deterministic and social movement theory voluntaristic, this paper is trying to bridge this tension by adopting the Theory of Structuration (Giddens, 1984). The paper hopes that structuration perspective can explain in a greater detail with regards to the formation of the networks and the consequences of it, be they intended or unintended. Central to Giddens’ structuration theory is the understanding that the relationship between actor’s interaction (action) and structure is a duality, instead of dualism, i.e. that they are recursive and produce and reproduce each other in an ongoing, routinised cycle (Giddens, 1984:2). There are three ontological levels of structures and interactions, i.e. signification-communication; dominance-power; and legitimacy-sanction, within which routines are enhanced by modalities (Giddens, 1984:29).

5 In another field, in an effort to understand the diffusion of information technology in organisations, a similar approach was taken, called Adaptive Structuration Theory or AST posited by DeSanctis and Poole (1994), which has been explored in a few cases (such as in Fichman, 2000; Orlikowski, 1992; 2000; 2002; Shumarova and Swatman, 2006).

6 Of course, there are a lot of different concepts in the Theory of Structuration centred around critiques about dualism (critique to functionalism, critique to structuralism and post-structuralism, among others), time-space distanciation, institutional reflectivity, double-hermeneutic, abstract systems, among others. They are not discussed in this chapter, instead, are incorporated in the relevant part of the analysis.
This paper proposes the adaptation of the theory in two important aspects. First, the confirmation civil society movement as social structures that enable and constrain interaction in the CSOs. It adopts the central concept of structuration that the structure of actor’s interaction (i.e. that emerges in actor’s action as they interact within the network) and the structure of the movement (i.e. that are provided by the network) exist in a relationship of duality with each other such that they shape and reshape each other continuously. Second, the confirmation about the importance of perceptions which maintains the recurring social practice of networking the movement. CSOs use the networks and create perceptions about how they helps facilitate their activities, which in turn influences the way in which the networks are used and mediate the impacts on themselves. This is what Giddens refers to ‘structuration process’, which produces routine as social practice (Giddens, 1984:75-76), i.e. the networking of the civil society movement.

It is clear that there is a two-way relationship in the networking processes between the propagating network institution (or the *explanans*) and the CSOs performing the networking (or the *explanandum*). The structure of civil society movement (network structure) disperses to the organisations and influences their behaviour, which in turn, modifies the networking. Just like Giddens’ original proposition about social practice, networking of social movement as social practice between network of social movement structure and CSOs’ actions is also exercised on the three ontological levels: signification-communication, legitimacy-sanction, and dominance-power.

Within social movement paradigm, this ‘routine-guided action’ is incited through generalisation of CSO’s actions and reciprocally routines are laid down in structure, which is reproduced through networking of activities. As soon as routines of networking stabilise, they become structural, subsequently structuring and guiding CSOs’ actions. Repetitive networking builds and transforms social movement, thus guaranteeing system reproduction. As the act of networking is fundamentally a recursive process of constitution, it is important to recognise the consequences of such enactment, be they intended or unintended. Because the enactment of network is situated within a number of nested and overlapping social systems, CSOs’ networking will always enact other social structures along with network itself. In their recurrent and situated action, CSOs thus draw on structures of social
movement that have been previously enacted and in such action reconstitute those structures. Such reconstitution may be either intended, or, as is more usual, unintended. In the networking of social movement there are at least two ‘layers’ of social systems: one is the CSO itself as a social system (at intra-organisational level) where activists or members of CSOs’ activities is structured, and two is the civil society movement context as another social system (at inter-organisational level) where interactions among organisations through networking of actions are also structured.

At the intra-organisational level, deriving from theory of structuration, activity (or programme) is both a product of (arrow 1) and also a medium for (arrow 2) human action. At organisational level, institutional properties influence how organisation’s members organise their activities (arrow 3), and at the same time, the activities influence the institutional property of the organisation (arrow 4). At the inter-organisational level, networking of actions is also both a product of (arrow 5) and a medium for (arrow 6) CSO’s activities. In the network of CSO movement, institutional property of the movement influences how individual CSO networks (arrow 7) and at the same time the network influences the movement itself (arrow 8).

In this light, the focus of studying the civil society movement could be twofold. First, at intra-organisational level, it is important to examine the influence of networking as part of the activities on CSO itself (arrow 4). Second, as networking is substantial in inter-organisation works, it is also important to study the way networking mediates CSO’s work (arrow 6) and influences civil society movement (arrow 8) altogether, at the inter-organisational level. The first quest has partly been answered, albeit using different perspective, elsewhere (Nugroho, 2008a). The second focus is dealt here.
3. Data and methods

3.1. Framework

As suggested in the previous section, the dynamics of Indonesian CSOs relates reciprocally with the civil society movement, facilitated by networking. Using a structuration approach, this dynamic is depicted below, and serves as the underlying framework of investigation in this research.

![Figure 3. Changing landscape: A framework of investigation](Source: Author, based on Theory of Structuration (Giddens, 1984))

Engagement in civil society movement is a two-way process. The engagement of Indonesian CSO in the civil society movement affects (arrow $a$) and is affected by (arrow $b$) the movement itself, which evolves from time (t) to time (t+1). This engagement ($a$ and $b$) is facilitated through the act of networking of actions, ideas and interests. While the civil society movement itself evolves (arrow $d$), with regard to the changing landscape of the CSOs, the internal dynamics within the organisations (arrow $c$) also contribute to the change. The landscape of Indonesian CSOs at (t+1) is thus a result of the engagement with the movement, and at the same time, dynamics of the Indonesian CSO. As suggested by Giddens (1984), time-space is not only an arena where the change takes place, instead, time-space is a constitutive element as the change is ‘ordered across space and time’ (p. 2)7.

3.2. Triangulation

Triangulation methods combining quantitative and qualitative approaches is used here (Gilbert, 1992) as it helps achieve better measurement and provides different interpretations and meaning (Olsen, 2003) and because this research involves a relatively complex design, with multiple stages and

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7 Another scholar, Sewell (1992), provides a useful summary of Giddens’ Theory of Structuration. He argues changes arise from (1) the multiplicity of structures because societies are based on practices that derived from many distinct structures, at different levels, modalities, and resources; (2) the transposability of rules as they can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context they were initially learned; (3) the unpredictability of resource accumulation like investment, military tactics, or a comedian’s repertoire; (4) the polysemy of resources e.g. to what should success in resource accumulation be attributed; and (5) the intersection of structures because they interact (e.g. in the structure of capitalist society there are both the modes of production based on private property and profit, as well as the mode of labour organisation based on worker solidarity). (p. 16-19, my emphasis)
reiteration (Danemark et al., 2002). The quantitative part of triangulation consists of survey and social network analyses and the qualitative part comprises of interview and workshops.

The purpose of the survey is to gather data on which the mapping of the social networks of the respondent can be done. There are two network datasets. The first dataset for network mapping during the reform is acquired through asking with which organisations or the respondent CSOs established links with over a period of time (the list was given), which then is mapped directly using Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2003). The survey period was from October 2005 to January 2006. The second dataset for network depictions after the reform was collected through online crawler (Rogers, 2001; 2003) with the seed data sourced from the publicly available Indonesian CSOs directories: SMERU, TIFA, LP3ES and CRS –valid per 2005.

The interviews with 31 Indonesian CSO leaders are designed to obtain an in-depth understanding about the way networking social movement facilitates and is facilitated by the CSO’s work. The informants were purposively sampled as a result of the nature of the organisations (advocacy v. developmentalists) and organisational structure (formal/centralised v. informal/networked) of the CSOs they work with. The interviews were semi structured, carried out over the telephone, and recorded and transcribed for analysis purpose. Assuming the knowledge relevant to civil society activist is broadly distributed among organisations, a series of workshops in three centres of Indonesian social movement was conducted in 2006: Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. These workshops aimed at gaining insights into CSOs’ shared understandings of the network of social movements in Indonesia. All workshops were structured and divided into several sections focusing on certain aspects for discussions both in groups and in plenary sessions. Just like the interviews, the workshops used Indonesian. The workshop instructions and interview questions were formulated using simple language, common concepts and manageable tasks as cues in order to help participants and respondents provide as detailed information as possible (Converse and Presser, 1986). The interviews and workshops were analysed with help of Atlas.Ti™, which is particularly useful in organising, coding, tagging the transcripts, and mining the texts.

3.3. Network and temporal network analysis

There are two time periods in inquiry, matching the two datasets explained above. The first period, i.e. during the reform, covers the four significant, distinct frames relevant to the transition to democracy in Indonesia as depicted in Nugroho and Tampubolon (2008:para 2.10-2.17): Authoritarian period (pre-1995) – Bloody transformation (1996-1998) – Fraught euphoria (1999-2002) – Towards stability (after 2003). The second period, after the reform, covers four years from 2005-2009 in three time

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8 The application is authored by Richard Rogers and publicly accessible at http://www.issuecrawler.net/
points: 2005, 2007 and 2009. Hence in total, the paper will map the networks of Indonesian CSOs for a period of 14 years, covering from pre-reform (pre-1995) to recently (early 2009), in two sets of temporal networks: one in four different periods during the regime change and another one in three different time points after the reform—which reflect the dynamics of the Indonesian CSOs networks.

The first set of the temporal networks is a conventional social networks based on the data captured through the survey which were then converted into nodes and edges and fed into Pajek for a visual representation to show the growth of the networks during the political change (as depicted in Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2008 to maintain consistency and comparability). The second set of temporal networks is a hyperlink networks\(^9\) constructed using the data from the abovementioned Indonesian CSO directories. These directories provided web/URL addresses of Indonesian CSOs which were then fed into IssueCrawler in three different points: November 2005, November 2007, and February 2009. The seed data for the three crawling is based on the same 2005 data for the purpose of tracing the growth of the same network. The network data generated by IssueCrawler were then read by Pajek (with help of UCINET for conversion).

The network data is analysed using formal social network analysis (Scott, 2000). The empirical results are organised with reference to three key concepts in network analysis. Firstly, the cohesiveness. This paper uses k-core to measure cohesiveness, or more accurately clique-ishness, of the network\(^10\). The higher the maximum k-core, the more cliqueish the network is, and indicates a more cohesive network as it. Secondly, this paper deliberately distinguishes cliques from subgroup or cluster. A clique refers strictly to a maximally connected subgroup consisting of at least three nodes (Scott, 2000), whereas a cluster, a less restrictive formulation, facilitates and enables contacts among all nodes through intermediate nodes in a certain network position. Lastly, this paper uses the measure of network density and network centralisation. The comparison of densities is used to examine the networks of Indonesian CSOs during the regime change as the networks are of the same size. In contrast, the comparison of centralisation is applied to measure the CSO networks after the reform as the network sizes vary. This is in order to be able to analyse two different sets of network available, social networks and hyperlink networks. While the density (or average connection/link within the network) reflects “the general level of cohesion in a graph; centralisation describes the extent to which this cohesion is organised around particular focal points” (Scott, 2000:89). As a general clue in the analysis, a movement or mobilisation is facilitated when the network is relatively centralised.

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\(^9\) The nodes in a hyperlink networks are websites (linked by their hyperlinks). As pattern of hyperlinks in each website reflect specific nature of communication, agenda and objective of the website owner, the structural pattern of hyperlinks in each website “serves a particular social or communicative function” (Park, 2003:53).

\(^10\) For a network of size \(n\), the maximum k-core is \(n-1\), which means everyone is connected to everyone else or a clique (Scott, 2000).
To understand the link between networks and temporality this paper employs sequence analysis of network positions (Abbott, 1990) which observe the position of each node in the inter-organisational networks at a particular time register. An isolate (node not connected to any other nodes) may then move to peripheral, or even core, position as it establishes links with other nodes over time. This mapping will produce a sequence of network positions which helps conduct a kind of historiography to uncover typical or dominant patterns.

4. Results and discussion

4.1. Networking the actions, changing the political landscapes

The first map of the networks of Indonesian CSOs identifying links with their international and national partners (social networks) is generated using Pajek. It is evident that the network of Indonesian CSOs grew during the four periods of reform, indicated by the increasing k-core (from 3 to 6 for global network and 5 to 9 for national network) and density (from 0.0021 to 0.0092 in the global network and from 0.0029 to 0.0141 in the national network). The increasing cohesiveness and density of the network seems to have correlation with the socio-political dynamics in the country. It is observable that starting in the ‘authoritarian’ period (pre-1995), some CSOs had started building their international network and expanding their national link. From 2003 up to the present time, the networks appear to be more stable as confirmed by the change in the density measure. Similarly, the cohesion of the international networks also increases not only in conjunction with the national politics but also with the international civil society events. Networks of CSOs have been facilitating various activities, from direct financial support to involvement in direct activism such as meeting coordination, mass mobilisation, action planning, and others. It is important to see whether, and to what extent, networks of social movement effects the dynamics of CSOs, both at national and international level. See Fig 4.
Political periodisation (b)

Global network of Indonesian CSOs

- k-core = 3
- Density: 0.0021

- k-core = 3
- Density: 0.0027

- k-core = 5
- Density: 0.0064

- k-core = 6
- Density: 0.0092

National network of Indonesian CSOs

- k-core = 5
- Density: 0.0029

- k-core = 6
- Density: 0.0052

- k-core = 8
- Density: 0.0104

- k-core = 9
- Density: 0.0141

Major event affecting Indonesian CSOs

- Declaration of IGOS
- Indonesia Goes Open Source
- 30 June 2004

- The fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime
- 21 May 1998

- Seattle Protest
- 1999

- First Democratic Election since 1966
- First Direct Presidential Election
- 2004

- Impeachment of President Wahid
- 2000

- Economic Crises in Asia 1996-1997

- Indonesian Currency Exchange Fall
- July 1997

- Series of CSOs Demonstration

- Military-backed up attack following "Democracy Stage" at PDI-P Office

- Tornado 2004

- 1st World Social Forum (WSF)
- 2nd WSF
- 3rd WSF
- 4th WSF
- 5th WSF

"bloody transformation" "fraught euphoria" "towards stability"

Massive riots & social unrest

Political periodisation (b)

Figure 4 Expansion of Indonesian CSOs Networks during the reform period

N-network=350, all nodes depicted across period, links represent “join action”, data collected 2005-6

Network depictions appear in author’s earlier works (Nugroho, forthcoming; Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2008)
Many major socio-political events took place in the country during the heightened period from pre-1995 to the aftermath of 1998 reformasi and significantly affected CSOs activism (as also reported by Harney and Olivia, 2003; McCarthy, 2002). But at the same time, such events could only happen because of these CSOs involvement. Indonesian CSOs were affected by many socio-political events, but certainly they also played important part in preparing the condition conducive for the event and actively taking part in them. From the massive rally of “democratic opposition” responding to the occupation of the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) office following the military-backed attack on 27 July 1996 (Hosen, 2003:488), to the massive riots in mid May 1998 (Johnson, 1998:8-9), to “Semanggi II” massive protest in November 1999 (Cameron, 1999:5), Indonesian CSOs have been actively involved. This was also the case when Indonesian CSOs welcomed the first democratic election since 1966 which took place in 1999 (Hill, 2003), gathered support during the political crisis leading to the impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid (MacDonald and Lemco, 2001:178-180), and played an important role in widening public participation during the first direct Indonesian Presidential Election in 2004 (Wanandi, 2004).

Despite questions about the role of international networks during the heightened period of change in Indonesia prior to 1999 (e.g. as addressed in Nugroho and Tampubolon, 2006) the cease of authoritarian regime has given new impetus for more involvement of the global CSO within national politics. More global CSOs paid more attention to the Indonesian situation and established networks with Indonesian CSOs. Not only political events like elections in 1999 and 2004 became opportunity for networking with global CSOs (be it in terms of financial support, coalition, joint activities or other types of collaboration), humanity relief actions too have been always important junctures for networking. The aftermath of Tsunami 2004 saw a massive scale of global CSOs networking with Indonesian organisations, possibly unprecedented in the country’s civil society history. However, such situations in the country are not the only factor of the trend in the global networking of Indonesian CSOs. Participation of Indonesian organisations in many global civil society events such as Parallel Meetings in multilateral gatherings or world summits such as in Seattle in 1999 and its continuation, as well as in the series of World Social Forums (since 2001) also contribute to the growing global CSOs network with Indonesian groups. In this sense, civic engagement at the global level seems to be both an outcome and a means of global civil society networking.

The second map is the hyperlink networks of the Indonesian CSOs in 2005-2009, which to some extent reflect the structure of civil society activism on the Web (as argued by Park, 2003). These networks are also generated by Pajek, but using the data crawled by IssueCrawler instead of from the survey. The seed data was of the year 2005 to maintain comparability when the similar network is regenerated in 2007 and 2009. The aim of this mapping is to examine the changing in the structure of the network over time in order to make sense of it.
From the network data, the cohesiveness, or cliqueishness, of the networks keeps decreasing from 18 (2005) to 15 (2007) and 10 (2009) as indicated by the maximum core value. Loosely interpreted, this would mean that there is a weakening in civil society networks and activism from 2007 to 2009. However, as the sizes of the networks are not the same, relying only on cohesiveness might not be adequate. As discussed in the previous section, network centralisation is now used here as a complement to cohesiveness. Across the period from 2005 and 2009, the centralisation measure increases from 1.41% (2005) to 2.01% (2007) and to 2.92% (2009). This means that the structure of civil society network has become more and more able to facilitate movement or mobilisation as the network becomes relatively more centralised over the 2005-2009 period, despite that the overall network of social movement seems to be weakening. See Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=132</td>
<td>N=152</td>
<td>N=89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k-core=18</td>
<td>k-core=15</td>
<td>k-core=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network centralisation = 1.41%</td>
<td>Network centralisation = 2.01%</td>
<td>Network centralisation = 2.92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Civil society activism on the Web: Changing structure of Indonesian CSOs networks
*All nodes depicted by crawling using IssueCrawler™, links represent hyperlinks, data collected 2005-9*

It can also be observed that the structure of the 2005 network is the least clustered compared to 2007 and 2009 networks (2009 being the highest clustered network). The 2005 network consists of one relatively large cluster which makes up the biggest part of the network with peripheral nodes connected to the cluster. The 2007 network is significantly different as it has one distinct cluster and another much less salient cluster characterising the network. There are many brokers (to the extent that they can hardly be identified), which bridge the clusters and connect to the peripheral nodes, appear. There is a stark difference found in 2009 network where three marked clusters are formed, with one major cluster and two small clusters not connected to the major one) and brokers in the major cluster clearly appear, connecting much less peripheral CSOs. Overall, while the capacity of the network to facilitate movement increases over time (as indicated by network centralisation), the increasing clusterisation indicates a segmentation grows in the network of Indonesian CSOs –which is consistent with the weakening of the overall network (as indicated by the k-core).

Just like the first set of the network, the dynamics in the second set of civil society network is also both shaped by, and at the same time shapes, the socio-political landscape in the country. The
democratic transition achieved by election 2004 has been able to be preserved and consolidated and the county political stability has helped restore domestic social and economy harmony up to today. Last available data (Mietzner, 2008) indicates that this results the country’s economic growth of 6.4% (in 2008), increase of investment and export, rise in average income per capita ($2,400 in 2008 from $1,946 in 2007) and the overall recovery from the effects of the 1997–98 economic crisis (p.150-151). Civil society has been an inseparable part in these processes. Many CSOs work hand-in-hand to promote democratic, accountable and responsive political engagement, including fostering more democratic direct participation. CSOs not only safeguard people’s rights in advocacy works but also assist in development agenda in many ways, as already discussed in Section Two. In turn, the progress in democratic participation and the growth in the economy creates conducive environment for civil to increase their capabilities in organising the movements.

However, as CSOs engage with more variations of issues and concerns, partly due to the changing regime, they become diverse in terms of activities and programmes. The focus has moved to beyond state-centrist issues to a more broader one: enlightening society with new articulation of issues such as gender equality, promotion of pluralism, fulfilment of economic, social and cultural and rights, and poverty reduction (as observed in Nugroho, 2007). As result, the realm of Indonesian CSOs is characterised by activities which are multi-issue and multi undertakings. While this reflects the widening spectrum of certain CSOs’ ‘traditional’ issues, it may also contribute to building the segmentation in the CSO’s universe hence segmentation in CSO networks. More CSOs become clustered as they tackle specific issues and concerns with specific groups. Consequently, specific actions are organised by specific groups to address specific problems, which might be creating more segmentation in the whole movement. As empirically shown above, the set of hyperlink networks is sensitive enough to capture this dynamics.

4.2. Network dynamics in detail

It may be useful at this point to look at a more detail the dynamics of the Indonesian CSO network in order to understand how the network grew and how networking of social movement can be comprehended as an ongoing social practice. While the first set of network (social network of Indonesian CSO during reform period) can provide the detail needed for such an examination, it is not possible, however, to do so with the second set of network (hyperlink network) due to the nature of the data.

As early as before 1995, under Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the most well-known advocacy CSO in legal and humanitarian issue YLBHI and the biggest environmentalist NGO WALHI seemed to have become the most referred nodes in the Indonesian civil society network where active CSOs at that time networked or linked with. Indonesian CSOs also started building their network with their
international partners. Again, YLBHI seems to be the most active Indonesian CSO at that time building such international contact. See Figure 5. This is the period when the civil society movement leading to the political reform later in 1998 was started to be built.

**Between 1995-1998**, Indonesian CSOs started to grow significantly. Other strong networks emerged like UPC (Urban Poor Consortium, which organised and mobilised urban poor dwellers in several big cities in Indonesia), LPPHAM (advocacy NGO in human rights), Kalyanamitra (gender and women’s rights NGO), Elsam (research and advocacy NGO in human rights) and KEHATI (environmental NGO). Other (actually) older CSOs which were established back to 1985 like INFID (International NGO Forum for Indonesia Development), or LP3ES started to network with newer NGOs. Before (and some after) the crisis hit in 1997, new-but-quickly-growing NGOs appeared: TRuK (*Tim Relawan/Humanitarian Team*), KONTRAS (Commission for disappearances and political victims), ICW (Corruption watch), among others. In addition, many new CSOs in particular issues appeared (see the yellow nodes). This period was also when the Internet started to be widely introduced in some big cities in Indonesia by universities, commercial providers and one NGO, i.e. INFID. Having engaged with the technology, some CSOs, particularly those located in big cities with standard equipment to connect the cyberspace started to build their international network. As it is pictured below, both national and international network of Indonesian CSO grew significantly. Loosely termed, this was the period when Indonesian CSOs networks were ‘hiding behind the screen – building the resistance’. It is also observable, compared to the previous period, how quickly the new international networks emerged in the map. This may be proof that it was also the international collaboration that empowered Indonesian CSOs at that time to build their resistance. See Figure 6.
After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, political euphoria stormed the country – including to civil society. The period of **1999-2002** witnessed the rapid growth of CSO network. Note that with many new CSOs emerging, previous centres remained (YLBHI, UPC, LPPHAM, Kalyanamitra, etc.). It is interesting that new emerging CSOs quickly build their network (see the grey, green and pink nodes in the top picture of Figure 7). And as new media communication like the Internet became more widely available, not only did Indonesian CSOs build their network within the country, they also established new international networks. The networks of Indonesian CSOs ‘in the midst of the political euphoria’ are depicted below.
It seemed that various international CSOs (originated from various, but mostly developed, countries) paid close attention to Indonesian situation, particularly after the authoritarian regime stepped aside, and were willing to network with Indonesian CSOs. Most of them are international donor (Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation, Japan Foundation, etc), developmentalist international organisations (like JICA, HBF, UNESCO, ICCO, MercyCorps, etc.), environmental and human rights international NGOs (like DTE, Rarre, Life Japan, etc), international NGOs promoting democracy, civil supremacy and good governance (Novib, CordAID, FES, HSF, etc), among others working in other issues like children (Save The Children UK, etc), conservation (US Fish and Wildlife, etc.).
From 2003 onwards, a big number of CSOs have been established in Indonesia. Confirmed by the survey (and some from interviews), the growth of the CSO number is at large due to the larger freedom in political expressions and associations post-Soeharto’s administration. Many new CSOs are set up, notably in response to more specific issue. However, although the network grows rapidly, the centrality of the network as the movement remains relatively unchanged. The network of Indonesian CSOs in this period continue to centre around the ‘old players’ (indicated by the bigger nodes). Some established (and older) CSOs are influential and in most cases, as confirmed from interviews, even contribute to the birth or establishment of new CSOs.

Figure 8 Indonesian CSO Network: 2003 onwards – “Towards a new Indonesia”

Top: National network; Bottom: International network
All nodes depicted via survey, links represent ‘joint action’, data collected 2005-6

22
4.2. Networking social movement as social practice

From the structuration perspective (Giddens, 1984), networking is essentially a recursive process. Interviews and workshops revealed that networking has become constituted in CSOs. The examples from the workshops and interviews are abundant (particularly reported in Nugroho, 2008a). Further, through interviews and workshops, five strategic activities in CSO networking have been identified: collaboration, mobilisation, empowerment and development, research and publication and advocacy (depicted in detail in Nugroho, 2007). These strategic activities are not just a direct output of networking, but with network and networking continuously shifting and being shaped, networking of social movement is more about process than outcome. Strategic activities are developed and continuously modified and adapted to bring them into alignment with the organisations’ routines. Networking social movement, in other words, is always ‘in-practice’ (emergent), rather than fixed.

The way CSOs build the network of social movement enacts other social structures. For example, communication among key activists has become standard for coordinating rallies or other joint activities. The use of certain safe communication channel has become common practice for advocacy works. These were among examples often referred to by the participants in the workshops and interview respondents. In their recurrent and situated action in networking their movement, CSOs thus draw on previously enacted structures and reconstitute those structures. Such reconstitution may be either deliberate (like posing key activists communicating actions), or, as is more usual, inadvertent.
(such as when using encrypted communication channel among CSOs becomes routinised). When reflecting on how civil society network has had an impact on the reshaping of socio-political life in Indonesia, the discussion about the nested and overlapping structure of networking occurred across the workshops (Nugroho, 2007). All CSOs participating in this study agreed that they experience at least two ‘layers’ of social systems when they network their activities. Firstly, in their own individual CSO (intra-organisational level) where civil society engagement is structured. Secondly, the social movement in Indonesia as another social system (inter-organisational level) where networking among CSOs are structured and constituted (Anheier, 2003; Kaldor, 2003; Wainwright, 2005; Warkentin, 2001).

At the intra-organisational level, as acknowledged by the Indonesian CSOs in the workshops, the institutional properties of CSOs, like values, issues, concerns and perspectives have both influenced and are influenced by how staff and activists network with their counterparts. However, because networking has become routinised, often this two-way process is not recognised. At the inter-organisational level, joint movement and actions among CSOs are also both a product of and a medium for a CSO’s activities (as suggested by Crossley, 2002; Della-Porta and Diani, 2006). For example, in the Indonesian social movement, institutional properties of the movement like orientation, strategic targets, or lines of thought, have influenced how an individual CSO joins the network, but at the same time the way CSOs collaborate with each other also influences the movement (as also identified by Davis et al., 2005; Diani, 2003). Networking social movement has contributed, in part, to the changing roles of Indonesian CSOs, which, as a result, reshapes the socio-political landscape of the country.
As a methodological note: The distinction between intra- and inter-organisational levels, at least on an analytical level, is important to understand the implication of civil society network in CSOs. It is also just as important to make a distinction between the intended and unintended nature of the implication. There are at least two empirical reasons. First, individual activists are always potentially able to change their habitual acts in networking as their experience also changes in the networking itself. In this way, both their experience and the way they network are changed by each other. Second, in civil society movements, similarly, any CSO has the potential to change the way in which they participate in the movement over time. In this way, both the movement and the individual CSOs are changed by each other.

4.3. Network: Instrumentum or locus of power?

These results show two important things. One, network of Indonesian civil society movement is dynamic. It was becoming more and more cohesive during the reform/transition period to democracy as shown in the first set of (social) network. But there is an indication that while the capacity of the network to mobilise movement remains increasing there might be a weakening in the overall network after the reform as revealed in the second set of (hyperlink) network. Two, that building social movement is always a two way process that both shapes and is shaped by CSOs involvement by means of network(ing) as modality. Socio political landscape, at national and international level, is both medium and result of social movement which significantly affect, but is also affected by, civil society activism. Socio-political events are both outcomes and fabrics of the socio-political engagement of Indonesian civil society. As outcomes, the events reflect how Indonesian civil society has advanced its movement and partaking in social change. As fabrics of civic engagement, such socio-political events provide context and opportunity for Indonesian civil society organisations to link each other’s work. Network is not just instrumental to social change in the country; it is the arena for change in its own right.

Indonesian CSOs network has grown from a small network, which became wider and, in a period, more cohesive, challenging the government’s repressive policy, with a marked momentum in the establishment of INGI (later INFID) in 1985 (Hadiwinata, 2003:98-100). It is this growth of the network of Indonesian CSOs that once worried the Indonesian government as it was through such a network the government’s policies kept being challenged both through protests and advocacy works within the country and especially in international interactions. By means of such a network, local CSOs could voice their concern or pass relevant information about socio-political problems (usually related to state’s violence, human rights violation or development) onto their international partners who would use the information to pressure Indonesian government in international gatherings through their own governments or by way of protests. “Brussels incident” is a typical example when perceived powerless Indonesian CSOs used international network to question Indonesian government’s
development policies during a multi-lateral meeting (Hadiwinata, 2003) – something that would have never happened in Indonesia. This networking, both with international partners and with local/national CSOs, has been able to give Indonesian CSOs some bargaining power to challenge the authoritarian regime and, arguably, bring it to an end. Clearly that networking has been essential not only in enlarging capacity of individual CSOs, but also in being part of the social movement – in other words, an enlargement of CSO’s capacity through networking is made possible.

However, networking is not without problems. In addition to dependency relationships, such as ‘donor-recipient’ type of links which has been alleged to be the core of accountability problem in the CSOs’ universe (as indicated several times by Edwards and Hulme, 1995; 1996; 1997), networks also bear some problematic issues, including control and influence over issues and concerns and activities of ‘less powerful’ CSOs as members of network. For example, networking with CSOs from richer countries, who usually also provide financial assistance, is at times not free from interest: there are instances when financial support received by Indonesian CSOs has been conditionality related to the issues and concerns they have to work on (as documented in Nugroho, 2007). This contributes to the feeling of ‘being steered’ or ‘under subordination’ towards their international, more powerful, partners. What was expected to be equal position in the network has become patron-client relationship. Despite the benefits they receive from this global network, more Indonesian CSOs think they are only ‘subcontractors’ of organisations based in rich countries. This opinion may have some backup. Some scholars see processes of this sort as part of a meta-narrative of ideology and hegemony (Chua, 2002; Huntington, 1991; Petras, 1997). Networking with global CSOs is seen as instrumental to the ‘retailing’ of liberal democracy a la USA with local CSOs as the ‘retailers’ (Chua, 2002). In this regard, CSOs will lose their critical views towards capitalism ideology and, worse, take part in establishing global capitalist infrastructures in Southern countries (Huntington, 1991; Petras, 1997). Obviously, this gloomy view of global CSO networking is heavily challenged by civil society scholars today, who optimistically argue that it is the global civil society which can make ‘another world possible’ through consolidating actions, interests and visions (Anheier and Katz, 2005; Bonbright, 2006; Wainwright, 2005; Warkentin, 2001).

6. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that networks have a central role in the civil society movement in Indonesia. Networks becomes central as they are not only a means or instrument for CSOs in administering social movements, but it is also a locus where CSOs organise their power to bring about societal changes. Social movement has long been understood as a way in which civil society engage in power contestation and challenge the domination of state bodies and market organisations. It is
imperative therefore for CSOs to strengthen their networking, partly because CSOs are not designed to compete for formal political power and thus networking can be an effective strategy to influence formal political decision, both at the national and at international level. However, engaging in power contestation through networking social movement is always a two ways process. Through networking the dynamics of social movement affect and at the same time are affected by the organisations from time to time. Likewise, as the societal setting changes as an outcome of the power contestation through social movement, it also impacts the internal dynamics of the CSOs. Networks of social movements are no longer just an instrument for civil society to mobilise resources and action: it has become a locus of power in society, a powerful fabric of social change.

Structuration perspective has been proven useful to systematically probe and understand how the building of social movement takes place both at intra- and inter-organisation level. The argument about the complex, two-way process of networking in building social movement as social practice would not have been as clear if it did not benefit from the theory of structuration. Likewise, the limited and different kind of material gathered during the research can be significantly given meaning by the application of social network methods and structuration perspective. It is in the combination and conversation across theories that have allowed this paper to probe the issues deeper and wider. This could potentially be a tool in understanding other social incidences.

One shortcoming of this paper arises from its relatively limited network data for a full blown comparison and analysis of network dynamics. While the social network data for network mapping during the reform period (pre-1995 to 2003) is highly solid as it was collected directly from CSOs through a country scale survey, the data for network depiction beyond 2003 can only be derived from hyperlink network of CSOs’ website registered in the directories in 2005. A more rigorous analysis could be achieved had all the data sourced from the similarly solid resource. Even with this limitation, this paper manages to present an evidence of the network dynamics of Indonesian CSO and social movement over the past 14 years. The generalisation of the result, however, can only be suggestive.

**Acknowledgement**

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