Network dynamics of global CSOs in the transition to democracy in Indonesia

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Abstract

We make transparent the mutually reinforcing relationships between global civil society, democracy and network society which are often implicit in extant theories. However, very little has been said about how these apparent mutually reinforcing relationships came about. Focusing on the case of Indonesia during the fraught regime change from authoritarianism to democracy, we investigate the role of global and national civil society organisation during the periods of pre-reform, reform and post-reform. Using social network analysis and interviews with civil society activists we discover a less encouraging picture of these relationships. We account for this finding in terms of chequebook activism characterising the global civil society’s role during an abrupt and bloody regime change.

1. Introduction

Global civil society, democracy and network society are often mentioned in the same breath and their relationships are mostly seen to be mutually reinforcing. Yet scholars have noted some potential problems that might be embedded within such relationships. For instance, there are concerns about civil society organisations (CSOs) and their accountability (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; 1997), democracy that does not seem to be effective any longer in bringing about development (Fung and Wright, 2001) and the account of network society and the tensions it brings that may result in increasing isolation and fragmentation (Silverstone, 1996).

Despite these concerns, however, we argue that essentially one can see that there is a virtuous relationship between global civil society, democracy and network society. Some scholars suggest that global civil societies can be seen as conducive to democracy (for example Anheier et al., 2005). Studies also illustrate that global civil society also goes hand in hand with global network society not only through facilitation of communication and participation through the Internet but the very ideas at the core of civil society (a society that is open and participatory) is very much in tune with network society (a society that is less hierarchical, less bureaucratic, open and inclusive) (for instance Warkentin, 2001). Likewise, democracy and network society are conducive to the support of each other if not seen to be reinforcing one another. Democratic participation can be facilitated through multiple connections which ensure informed and interactive politics (Sey and Castells, 2004: 363). Wainwright suggests that a new relationship between civil society and democracy is being forged at the international level, where there is a new impetus to build organisations of civil society as a force for achieving and deepening democracy or rebuilding it in a radically new context (Wainwright, 2005).

Therefore, an understanding of the mutually reinforcing links between global civil society, network society and democracy can be presented below.
But how did this mutually reinforcing relationship evolve historically? What conjunctive circumstances led to the establishment of these relationships? These are empirical questions that need addressing. Sey and Castell (2004: 364) suggest that the answer “has to be established by observation, not proclaimed as fate”. This suggestion resonates with Wainwright,

“To study civil society is not to defend some abstract or universal connection between civil society and democracy. Rather … an analysis of democracy which points to civil society as a potential source of power for democracy … through several examples – some positive, some negative– the condition under which, and the ways in which, this potential is realised.” (Wainwright, 2005: 94-95, our emphasis)

This paper answers some of these questions by examining the roles of global and local civil society embedded in a network society at an instance of bloody regime change from authoritarianism to democracy.

We take Indonesia as a case study for two main reasons. Not only has Indonesia experienced a heightened and bloody transition to democracy in 1998 (Bird, 1999), but also various civil society organisations (CSOs) in Indonesia had started networking with their international partners and thus were already embedded in a network society when the political upheaval took place (Uhlin, 2000). Indeed, there has been debate among scholars on the issue as to which actors significantly drove the political change in Indonesia. Mietzner (1999) argues that it was the political élite and the military, whereas Bourchier (1999) argues that the civil society was the significant actor. Both agree, however, that the political circumstances during the transition period to democracy were abrupt and intense. It seems obvious to us that an interaction between civil society (in the forms of public protests organised by many civil society groups and organisations) and the political élite and military (who then split and led to the resignation of President Soeharto) led to the fateful change. We agree with Uhlin (2000: 11) that the split between the élite and the military would have never happened if there had not been such strong pressure from civil society.

Such pressure would also not have been effective had the civil society, involved in promoting democracy, not been well embedded and networked. Naturally there were many other factors operating, but we believe that one of the most important is the network, which enabled them to put pressure towards, and thus promoted, changes in society (Diani, 2003). Some scholars have employed the network perspective to determine how it can be used to portray projects undertaken by civil society, amongst which the promotion of democracy seems to be the major agenda item. This is done through coalition building (Diani, 1990; Lim, 2002; 2003; Rucht, 1989) and building opposition, e.g. through establishing collaboration, publishing and campaigning, mobilization and observation like watchdog activities (Camacho, 2001; Surman and Reilly, 2003; Warkentin, 2001). We also note the importance of the network perspective to foster social movement as networks link a multiplicity of actors, which is necessary for, amongst other things, facilitating democratisation (Anheier, 2003; Uhlin, 2000).
We consider it important to study the dynamics of civil society from the social network perspective. Referring to the Scheme 1 illustration, the purpose of this paper is to answer questions such as were there differentiated roles for global civil society during the different periods of democratic change? More specifically, what was the role of global civil society during the period? The focus of our investigation will, however, be limited to the periods of the heightened transition to democracy in Indonesia.

We have briefly examined the focus of this study here. In section 2 we elaborate the links between global civil society, network society and democracy and present the political context in Indonesia. In section 3 we present the triangulation of methods we use in this study consisting of survey, social network analyses (SNA) and in-depth interviews with activists and networkers. In section 4 we elaborate the findings of the study and we discuss them in more depth in section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.

2. Global civil society, democracy and network society

2.1. A mutually reinforcing links?

Links involving global civil society are not always unproblematic (see e.g. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; 1997) however here we elaborate on the mutually reinforcing links involving global civil society.

First, global civil society may be conducive to democracy. Kaldor et al. (2004) provide an example.

“The last two decades have witnessed the spread of democracy… This phenomenon, is linked to globalisation and to global civil society… Pressure for democratisation has been partly a result of pressures from above [and outside]. More importantly, pressure for democratisation has come from below, from civil society groups that have been able to expand the space for their activities through links with the outside world.” (p. 13)

Wainwright (2005) also suggests that civil society is not simply a ‘sphere’, but a source of power for democratic change in new, more international forms, which conveys an awareness of civil society as a source of power, including power to bring about political change (2005).

Second, studies suggest that the emergence of global civil society is inseparable from network society. First, it is because the idea at the core of civil society (i.e. an open and participatory society) is much in tune with network society. Based on the study of the social movements network of global justice issue, Juris (2004) for example, argues that networks are increasingly associated with values related to grassroots participatory democracy and thus have become a powerful cultural ideal. Particularly among civil society groups, networks have become a guiding logic that provides both a model of and a model for emerging forms of directly democratic politics on local to global scales (p.342). This idea has become possible because of the facilitation of new information and communication technology (ICT). Warkentin (2001) points out,

Because the Internet’s inherent characteristics and transnational reach parallel those of global civil society, the medium serves as both a logical and an effective tool for establishing and maintaining social connections that can contribute to global civil society.

Third, scholars have long argued that democracy and network society are seen to be reinforcing one another. Historically, democracy meant having selected an elite of political representatives in political discussions. Then, having ‘direct’ democracy by involving the
citizen in the decision making process became the ideal. With the help of ICT this ideal has become possible today although still considered problematic (Coleman, 1999). The rise of the network society characterised by the appropriation of ICT has provided a renewed support for this vision, as Richard (1999) puts it:

“The vision of leaders and their governments actively working in collaboration with citizens and interest groups towards measurable goals is prominent in Internet related discourse. This ideal may come from the fact that the Internet blends tools for public participation and representation in a unique way” (p.71)

It is clear that democratic participation can manifest via manifold relations within network society and thus ensures informed and interactive politics. Sey and Castells (2004) investigate the emerging interaction between people and democracy in the process of political representation in the new form of networked public space constituted by the Internet. They warn that “it is only under the conditions of an autonomous citizenship and an open, participatory, formal political channel that the Internet may innovate the practice of politics” (p.370).

We now look more closely at the connection between civil society and democracy.

2.2. Civil society and democracy: Universal or particular connection?

Civil society is a relatively new concept and academics are still grasping it. Loosely yet operationally defined (e.g. Anheier et al., 2005), civil society is understood as a sphere of ideas, values, different kinds of groups with some degree of autonomy in relation to the state, economic entities and the family. Groups in this sphere develop identities, articulate interests and try to promote a specific political agenda. That is why it is no surprise that much research on civil society and democratisation have used civil society as a variable explaining the democratisation of formal political institutions. The literatures are rich in hypotheses about the relationship between civil society and democracy.

But is this relation universal? Wainwright notes the contingent nature of links between civil society and democracy, which implies the possibility of links between civil society and democracy to be severed. Acknowledging the Tocquevilean view about civil society as a protection against abuses of state power, she claims that dissident networks composed of civil society had moved from a defensive role to something more proactive, that is an agency for change with an emphasis on self organisation, mutual support and autonomy, which became a de facto challenge to authority.

2.3. A synthesis and hypothesis

Our study follows on from Wainwright’s suggestion by elaborating on different periods where these links are severed or strengthened. We focus on the example of Indonesia to examine the ways in which the connection between civil society, democracy and power are realised.

We now synthesise characteristics of network dynamics to clarify the effect of democratic change on the structure of networks involving global civil society. There are two alternative roles for global civil society which we call ‘initiator’ and ‘responsive participant’. Both roles are consistent with previous discussions of the relevant relationships. To anchor our ideas, we use three typical periods of democratic change; pre-transformation, transformation and post transformation.

In the initiator role, global civil society tends to be involved in networks which are dense during both the pre-transformation and the transformation period. During the post transformation period, it matters less whether the network is dense. Furthermore, we expect that the shape of networks during the first two periods is quite similar; i.e. there is a high
network correlation between pre-transformation and transformation periods and lower correlation between the transformation and post-transformation period. Global civil society as the responsive participant would be consistent with a network that is relatively sparse during pre-transformation and significantly denser during transformation. The latter is the result of being responsive to the change that is taking place. Furthermore we expect a low network correlation between the two periods and perhaps a higher degree of correlation during transformation and post-transformation periods. We characterise our expectation in terms of network density and shape correlation to give a more precise handle on the empirical evidence.

2.3. Transition to democracy in Indonesia: Periods and context

There are four significant, distinct periods relevant to the transition to democracy in Indonesia.

2.3.1 Pre 1995: Authoritarian period

From 1965 until May 1998, General Soeharto led Indonesia in a highly authoritarian way and called his leadership period the ‘New Order’, to distinguish from the ‘Old Order’ led by the former President Soekarno. The New Order regime was dominated by the military and was able to resist pressure for democratisation. There were conflicts in the political elites and the military, but these were factional and easily controlled and manipulated by Soeharto. The regime was extremely powerful and became relatively autonomous in relation to society (Uhlin, 2000). Due to its position in the global capitalist system and anti-Communist ideology, the regime received substantial economic, military and political support from the West. Until the mid 1990s, the world saw Indonesia as a politically stable state with an impressive record of economic growth. As a result, this is the first period where civil society was weak, depoliticised and fragmented (Hill, 2000).

2.3.2 1995 – 1998: Bloody transformation

From the middle of the 1990s civil society started expressing its discontent more openly. A new generation of advocacy groups, mainly pro-democracy and human rights groups, were formed and became increasingly active in anti-government protests. These groups were characterised by their attempts to unite all forms of pro-democracy movements and increase pressure against the government, including establishing alliances with peasants and workers (Uhlin, 1997: 110-114). Women’s movements became more prominent in organising themselves and expressing their concern on the economic crisis that hit countries in South East Asia in 1997. Some women’s groups promoted domestic issues (like milk and food scarcity) in national, political, economic debates and raised women’s awareness more widely. By doing so, they contributed to the process of democratisation (Kalibonso, 1999). Other developmentalist and professional civil society groups also started organising themselves and spread political awareness among their beneficiaries including farmers and urban workers.

As a result a wide spectrum of civilians academics, civil servants and street vendors, joined hand-in-hand expressing concern and protesting to the government. Ordinary workers, who were often pictured by the media as ‘ignorant’ and ‘opportunistic’, also actively organised themselves and were directly involved in the street protests (Prasetyantoko, 2000).

The beginning of the end of Soeharto’s 36 years of authoritarian government in Indonesia was actually precipitated by the Asian economic in 1997. When the crisis hit Indonesia and the regime could hardly retain its power students pioneered and led mass demonstrations and demanded the President’s resignation.

Student activism has always played an important role in Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 1995). In 1997 scores of CSOs also joined in with the students giving support to the movement. After a short and bloody period which cost the lives of students who protested in the streets,
accounts of missing activists who were protesting the government’s policies, thousands of people dead in mass riots, many reports of women raped and vast material destruction, on 21 May 1998 Soeharto, who was eventually abandoned by the military, was forced to step down. His 36 years of administration had come to an end and 1998 saw a historical moment when Indonesia entered a period from authoritarian rule to democracy.

2.3.3. 1999 – 2002: Fraught euphoria

His successor Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie, under both international and national pressure, introduced some political reforms and revived political activities that had been stifled for more than three decades: some political prisoners were released, free elections were promised and a referendum took place in East Timor, which led to East Timor’s independence.

Almost at a stroke political space in Indonesia was considerably widened. Yet, because it was sudden and massive, its effect was euphoric for most of the people in the country. Farmer organisations and trade unions became radicalised, underground organisations came to the surface and joined hands with the newly formed civil society groups and organisations (Hadiz, 1998; Silvey, 2003). Hundreds of new political organisations and political parties were formed and the media became much more independent and critical of the government. But the transition was not entirely painless. In 1999 Habibie called for a parliamentary election after widespread social unrest. Massive student led protests for greater democracy in Jakarta turned violent after a harsh military crackdown on demonstrators killed at least five students and two others. Rioting spread as demonstrators burned shops and cars across the capital city. At least 16 were killed over a period of several days (Ito, 1999).

After the first free election in 1999 which was surprisingly peaceful, Dr. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected by the People’s Assembly to become the 4th president of Indonesia. During his two-year presidency many new ‘liberating’ policies were introduced, although some were regarded as ‘controversial’. These policies overturned old discriminative policies which had been in place under Soeharto’s and Habibie’s regimes.

After further political turmoil in 2001, which led to the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid, the vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri became President. She remained in power until she lost the 2004 election which was won by ex-general SBY Yudhoyono and who remains in power today. This third period (1999-2002) was obviously marked with relatively chaotic political change due to the euphoric reaction after the displacement of the authoritarian leader.

2.3.4. 2003 – after: Towards stability

The political situation seems to have ‘settled down’ from 2003 onwards. During 2003 preparations for the election 2004 were made, which took the reform process further through extending the range of publicly elected positions. For the first time voters directly elected the President and Vice-president. They also elected representatives to the newly established House of Regional Representatives. These elections were the first in the history of Indonesia in which there was no government appointed member of parliament. In addition, the election system itself had been reformed: voters were able to identify their preferred candidate from the party lists, the electoral districts had been reduced in the hope of fostering more direct linkages between members of the Parliament and their respective constituents (UNDP, 2004). Despite worries from pro-democracy civil groups about President Yudhoyono whose background was in the military, as a nation, Indonesia has begun to show an evolving political maturity.

This period, which significantly differences from the previous period of euphoria, seems to have marked a new era in the democratisation process in Indonesia. Civil society groups, who have been important actors throughout the previous two periods, now have a wider sphere to act as a ‘check-and-balance’ for both government and business. They actively address various
concerns and issues in order to advocate people’s rights, to protect their environment and to develop their livelihoods and thus bring about social change in many aspects. Some groups try to do so by influencing governmental policies, promoting ethics and accountability, building public opinion and providing alternative medias. In terms of concerns and issues, civil society is characterised as more diverse compared to its identity during the authoritarian regime.

During the four periods, actors within civil society have undoubtedly played a very important role in the transition to democracy in Indonesia. This is despite a claim that civil society in itself is neither strong nor pluralistic (Uhlin, 2000). An Indonesian scholar has written an important note; that the extent to which these civil society groups succeed or fail in achieving their missions and goals depends not only on their own capacity to organise but also on the social and political context in which they operate (Hadiwinata, 2003: 36).

3. Methods

We map the international network of CSOs in Indonesia during the heightened periods around transition to democracy. We combine quantitative and qualitative approaches which give deeper insights into our research problems (Olsen, 2003). Specifically, survey and social network analysis (SNA) were performed to provide a broad picture of the Indonesian CSOs and their networks. In-depth interviews were then carried out to gain more detailed and specific information.

3.1. Survey

The survey was designed for two purposes. First, to capture the nature of Indonesian CSOs i.e. size, type of organisation, main issues and concerns and activities. Second, to identify the social networks of the CSOs by asking with which other organisations they link over time. More on the meaning of this link later. In the main section of our survey we ask: “With which international organisations listed below has your organisation established a link?” (“Dengan jaringan/organisasi internasional mana saja di bawah ini organisasi Anda menjalin hubungan?”) We ask the respondents to pick from a list of 34 international organisations (both donors and active organisations) known to have worked with Indonesian CSOs along with the period they established the link. We also give space to name organisations which are not listed.

The survey used Bahasa Indonesia and was extensively piloted. We allow the respondents to give a ‘no response’ if the questions were too sensitive for them or made them feel insecure.

The survey was targeted at the whole country and undertaken in two different modes, i.e. electronic and postal. The electronic survey included an automated Microsoft-Word™ form sent as an email attachment and an online survey application using Calibrum™ that enabled respondents with reasonably high-speed internet access to participate in real time. The postal survey was administered from Jakarta, using a printed version of the same questionnaires and sent to respondents via special express mail delivery. The target population were the CSOs listed in the four publicly available CSO directories (i.e. SMERU, TIFA, LP3ES and CRS). There were 946 CSOs whose email addresses were listed in the directories and they were all invited to the electronic survey, of which, 394 email invitations were bounced back due to unreachable addresses. Of all CSOs listed without email addresses, 50% (790) were invited to undertake the postal survey and only 384 postal invitations were returned due to unreachable addressee. In total, the survey was sent to 957 CSOs (552 electronically and 405 by postal) and was responded to by 254 (26.8%) organisations during 15 November 2005 – 15 January 2006.
The response rate seems disheartening at first but we are encouraged by three facts. First, given that the concept of civil society is still very much debated, this somewhat low rate is understandable. Therefore a census of CSOs or a register of CSOs in both developed and developing countries is practically non-existent (for and attempt, see “Global Civil Society” series (Anheier et al., 2005)). A census or register is of course a major factor in a successful, high response survey. We use the best available registers to hand and are satisfied with the nominal response of 254. Second, very few existing figures are available on response rate and nominal response for on-line surveys in developing countries. This low response rate could be the result of inadequate infrastructure (compared to developed countries) combined with the relative novelty of the online survey among CSOs (even in developed countries). We are not aware of many high response on-line surveys due to, for instance, the use of broadcast surveys. We believe the nominal response we have is respectable in this regard. Third, we further interview 31 activists of these CSOs. In effect, what we lack in breadth, we more than make up for in depth.

3.2. Social Network Analysis

We analysed network data using Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2003) version 1.10. A particular section of the survey has been designed to capture the temporal network of the respondent organisations with their international partners. We generated maps of how networks of Indonesian CSOs with their international partners have grown over time and put this into the socio-political context, i.e. periodisation of political change as above. We have a sequence of temporal networks in four different periods which reflect the dynamics of the links between Indonesian CSOs and their international partners.

Our choice of methods, however, is an examination of sequence of network maps to highlight changes in terms of increasing numbers of organisations and increasing intensity of involvement over time. Additionally, as evidence to examine our synthesis we present two statistics: network density and network correlation. The latter is tested using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), a variant of a permutation test for networks (Krackhardt, 1987) to deal with dependency inherent in network data.

3.2. Interviews

We conducted extensive interviews with 31 respondents which took 45 minutes to 120 minutes and averaging 75 minutes. The interviewees were leaders or senior activists purposively sampled to cover dimensions such as activities (advocacy v. developmentalists) and structure (formal/centralised v. informal/networked). Significantly, the interviewees are located in different positions in the networks (centre, periphery and in-between) which allow us to capture the depth of meaning these networks hold for them.

4. Results

We present how Indonesian CSOs engage with network society. Then, we elaborate on what the link in the network means. Finally, we portray the dynamics of the networks of Indonesian CSOs over time.

4.1. Indonesian CSOs engaging with network society

Indonesian CSOs have become more in-tune with the global ideas such as democratisation, good governance, human rights, gender equality as well as with the more local concerns such as poverty alleviation. These are issues similarly embraced and fought for by CSOs all over the world (Anheier et al., 2005). We also find that in terms of activities, Indonesian CSOs are building their capacity to undertake training, research including consultancy works and
publication including dissemination of ideas, advocating victims, mass mobilisation and lobbying.

How do the Indonesian CSOs engage in the network society? Thanks to ICT particularly Internet-based computer mediated communication (CMC) available to them (97.83%), they found that their networks with their partner organisations are growing significantly, both nationally and internationally. Although most of the CSOs only use basic CMC like email or mailing lists due to poor communication infrastructure (43.48% connect through dial-up). They are used to organise CSOs activities quite effectively including networking, coalition coordination, public opinion building and even collective campaigning and in some cases influencing state’s policies. Engaging with the network society has also particularly been helpful for the Indonesian CSOs so that their aims and activities have become more focused and their perspective towards issues widened. Most of them believe that having been part of the network society has enabled them to widen their own perspective to the global level (88.37%) and expand their network (80.00%), both with other national CSOs and global CSO partners. Overall, taking part actively in the networked society has facilitated achievement of their mission and goals and thus foster a further democratisation. These organisations are also aware of the negative impact of this new communication technology affecting their organisational performances, from threats like virus and ‘spam’ massages to apparent time wasting because of these distractions.

4.2. Kerja bersama: understanding links between Indonesian CSOs

In our attempt to accurately picture how the network of Indonesian CSOs, we asked our respondents whether they link with other organisations (see Section 3.1). But, what do these links mean?

Traditional network study usually creates a single meaning for a link in a network, whether it is an arch or an edge, such as an email sent from a node to other node, a visit, a telephone call, collaboration, etc. However, imposing such notions would be impossible in our study due to the complexity of CSO activities. For example, knowing another CSO does not necessarily mean having a link. Also when a link is there, it does not have only a single meaning. Rather, it may mean more than that. In this case it includes working together in a campaign, joining in the same mailing list, undertaking a project together, engaging in collaboration, receiving money, exchanging activities, amongst other things. A respondent in our study put it thus,

“It is not easy to say [whom] we have networked with. We may know each other, meet or even to be together in an event, but it does not [obviously] mean we have a network with each other. We consider other organisations as our network if we have engaged in a work-together (‘kerja bersama’). And usually it is intensive. And long enough. And they are various [in terms of form]. [But] clearly [a network is] not only knowing or contacting each other.” (Interview with a male activist, national political CSO, based in Jakarta, 6 January 2006)

We follow Mohr’s suggestion on allowing the subjects to speak as closely as possible to their own practice or everyday use (Mohr, 1998) and then we only capture this as a node or a link. We consequently avoid early imposition of network ideas and concepts. In our networks here, links are understood as ‘kerja bersama’. It is this notion of ‘kerja bersama’, widely and commonly understood by CSOs who participated in our study, which is used when we asked them about their network. We present these networks next.
4.3. Network maps: Dynamics over periods

As pictured below, the international network of Indonesian CSOs grew during the four periods. We characterise in terms of number of organisations, density and k-core. The latter gives an idea of cohesiveness or cliqueishness of the network. The higher the network’s k-core usually means the more cohesive the network is.

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<td>under authoritarian</td>
<td>bloody transformation</td>
<td>fraught euphoria</td>
<td>towards stability</td>
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N = 350  
K-core = 3  
Density = 0.21

N = 350  
K-core = 3  
Density = 0.27

N = 350  
K-core = 5  
Density = 0.64

N = 350  
K-core = 6  
Density = 0.92

Table 2. Dynamics of the international network of Indonesian CSOs (Density in 10^{-3})

We can see by the increasing k-core and density that the networks are becoming more cohesive over time. We note a significant change in the dynamics after the bloody transformation: the first two periods are quite similar and less active (densities 0.21 and 0.27) and the last two periods are quite similar and more active (densities 0.64 and 0.92). In other words, there was a marked increase of global civil society activity, density jumped from 0.27 to 0.64 and k-core from 3-core to 5-core, between the periods of bloody transformation to fraught euphoria.

5. Discussion: Clarifying the link between global civil society and democracy

We want to suggest that the evidence here points to a degree of involvement of international CSOs that is more consistent with chequebook activism. We argue this in two steps. First, we break down network dynamics in terms of the involvement of donor and active participants or active links with international CSOs. This decomposition illustrates our argument regarding the kinds of activism displayed by donor and international CSOs. Donor CSOs have relatively constant/smooth participation throughout the periods, whereas other international CSOs have punctuated participation, especially after the turbulent years. Second, we discuss alternative kinds of activism especially the international CSO as initiator and responsive participant and present network dynamics consistent with those roles. We argue that since these kinds of dynamics are not observed, therefore international CSOs cannot be said to take the roles of initiator and responsive participants during the period here.

5.1. Decomposing network dynamics

As is widely known, global civil society involvement can be acted through funding and direct activism (Anheier, 2003; Edwards and Hulme, 1997). As noted above, we took the term ‘kerja bersama’ to capture the latter. As an interviewee relates,

“‘Kerja-bersama’ can be from funding, campaigning, into concrete/real work in the field. Usually [if we receive] money is also included. It is also ‘kerja bersama’. But
we also do a lot of ‘kerja bersama’ with other organisations, both local/national and international. That is what we call networking. If there is ‘kerja bersama’ then there is a network. Otherwise, there is no network. That is why we can engage in different ‘kerja bersama’ with different organisations from time to time.” (Interview with a male activist, national political CSO, based in Jakarta, 6 January 2006)

We can infer that ‘kerja bersama’ includes all activities implying real action including campaigning, coordination, collaboration, fund raising, other exchange activities, capacity building, etc. Consequently it is also clear that these links exclude activities without real action such as attending the same event, knowing each other, being in the same mailing list.

If we look carefully at the networks as depicted in Table 1 above, during the authoritarian period, some local, active CSOs have started building their international network. During the bloody transformation period, surprisingly, the network does not seem to grow significantly. After the bloody transformation period, the network grows very significantly. The end of authoritarian regime may have given new impetus for more involvement of the global CSO with national politics. Various global CSOs from mostly developed countries paid close attention to the Indonesian situation and were willing to establish networks with Indonesian CSOs. From 2003 up to the present time, the international networks appear to be more stable. Visually, we can see that the first two periods are distinct from the last two as also confirmed by the density measure. There is clearly a significant change in the network dynamics from the bloody transformation period (1995-1998) to fraught euphoria (1999-2002).

We want to know how real is this effect by breaking down network dynamics in terms of the involvement of donor vs. active participants international CSOs. We want to find out what drove this significant increase in global civil society involvement after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Was it mainly donor driven or participant driven? For that reason, we breakdown the networks into (i) networks with international donor (in which Indonesian CSOs mainly or mostly receive financial support only) and (ii) networks with international active civil society groups (in which Indonesian CSOs mainly work together in certain issues or concerns, in addition to some financial support in some cases).

First, we depict the dynamics of the networks between Indonesian CSOs and international donors.

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<td>k-core = 3</td>
<td>k-core = 3</td>
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<td>Density = 0.39</td>
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<td>Density = 1.36</td>
<td>Density = 1.60</td>
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Table 3. Dynamics of the networks of Indonesian CSOs with international donor

When we look at the donor links during the first two periods, we find that they are similar and likewise with the last two periods (see Table 3). Yet we notice a notable increase that takes
place between the second (bloody transformation) and the third (fraught euphoria) period. The density measures suggest that the change is also significant.

Next, we map the networks of Indonesian CSOs with their international active counterparts. We see can see clearly the marked increase (see Table 4) in the networks with active counterparts: there is a real involvement but with a distinctly different intensity in the different periods. In the first two periods, the networks are sparse and after the bloody transformation period, they grow significantly. However, the density measures indicate a less sharp increase.

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 275</td>
<td>N = 275</td>
<td>N = 275</td>
<td>N = 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k-core = 2</td>
<td>k-core = 2</td>
<td>k-core = 3</td>
<td>k-core = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density = 0.17</td>
<td>Density = 0.22</td>
<td>Density = 0.46</td>
<td>Density = 0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Dynamics of the networks of Indonesian CSOs with international CSOs (counterpart)

To recap the discussion so far we chart the densities in Figure 1. The graph shows that the increase in the density of the networks after the period 1995-1998 is mostly affected by the increase in the links with donors rather than the links with active global civil society. In other words, the increasing activity of Indonesian CSOs after regime change is much more a result of the increase of their relationships with international donors rather than real participation with global CSOs. This evidence strongly suggests that some forms of chequebook activism explain the observed involvement of the global CSOs during the various periods. The global civil society may have missed an opportunity to actively foster democratisation in Indonesia during the important transition.
5.2. Alternative explanation

Having proposed an interpretation of the network dynamics as above, here we discuss an alternative explanation that of the global civil society as initiator. In this case, the shape of their involvement displayed in the networks throughout the four periods would have looked like the figure below.

The sequence of networks would have been dense in the first two periods (i.e. under authoritarian and bloody transformation) if the global civil society had taken the initiative to empower network society (i.e. Indonesian CSOs with whom they work) to promote and foster democracy. If during the first two periods the involvement of global civil society had been extensive, it would be easier to imagine that the local organisations would have become more inspired, established and able to address their concerns about democratic change.
Alternatively, in terms of the mutually reinforcing links we set out in the introduction, if global civil society plays a role as initiator, the link between global civil society and network society is relatively more essential in bringing about the change. This is depicted with a bolder link below.

![Scheme 2. Global civil society as initiator](image)

Scholars have argued that the involvement of global civil society in Indonesia had started in the 1970s. The support from global civil society for democratic change in Indonesia is nothing new and has a considerable impact on the ideas and actions of the pro-democracy movement (Uhlin, 2000). Uhlin however, does not clarify the sense in which the impacts are felt or taken up by the local civil society. We show here, that the impact or the networks are different depending on the period. The link between global civil society, network society and democracy in Indonesia in the political upheaval cannot just be taken for granted: they are not equally important. Instead, it is the link between network society (in this case Indonesian CSOs) and democracy which is the important link to explain and to bring about the change: in other words to animate the scheme.

6. Conclusion

We show that the global civil society during the period under study displayed modes of activism that could be characterised as chequebook activism. It did not recognise the incipient democratic change and failed to take the opportunity and play its role in fostering democratisation in Indonesia. This case resonates with other examples of a problematic relationship of global civil society and democracy (in the case of Guatemala, see Wainwright, 2005). We, of course, recognise the possibility of organisations that do not fit this role and that have stood by their Indonesian counterparts through the difficult years. However, our evidence show that on the whole they could be said to have missed a great opportunity.

One limitation of the study arises from its reliance on the perceptions and activities of CSOs in Indonesia. One can argue that the picture and the argument may be very different had the international CSOs also been consulted. Their role and mode of activism may be interpreted significantly differently. However, we disagree with this position. Fundamentally, even if it were to be the case that international CSOs were active throughout the period of this study, their activism obviously was not recognised as such by those activists on the streets during the turbulent years. Even on reflection many years later, the participants still fail to recognise this alternative position. Therefore, if we accept this alternative position of more activism on the part of international CSOs, the evidence points to their failure to translate more activisms into real actions that is understood by their Indonesian counterpart.

Having demonstrated the fruitfulness of the scheme set out in the introduction, we comment on the potential of this scheme to look at new relationship between global civil society, network society and other global issues. It may be used to look at the dynamics of networks and the emergence of issues. Wainwright (ibid.), for example recognises the increasing salience of global issues. However, it is not obvious in her exposition how an issue becomes
global or how the local attach or reinforces the global. There is a sense in which her exposition assumes a trickle down effect of global issues; they seep down to dominate or to invite participation of local CSOs. It is entirely plausible however, that local issues were picked up by actors connected to the global CSOs and amplify them. In this case, the local issues become the source of global conscience or global understanding. It is possible to capture this process using the scheme above where local issues enter the scheme by first linking with local CSOs.

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1 Author names are in alphabetical order.
2 (as have been reported by many authors, like Bird, 1999; Uhlin, 2000)
3 (Mirrored at calibrum.com/Surveylet/takesurvey.asp?surveycode=4633EMSB45965)

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